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The story line is a familiar one. Japan in the Tokugawa period 
was a small cou~try, isolated from the rest of the world under the 
despotic and oppressive rule of a feudal lord known as the sho-
gun, and hierarchically divided into the four separate classes of 
samurai, peasant, artisan, and merchant. Then in 1853 Commo-
dore Matthew Perry arrived to open Japan, which responded by 
modernizing into a strong and prosperous modern nation-state. 
This is of course a mythology, but like all mythologies it is 
remarkably durable, and continues to appear in only modified 
guise in most nonspecialist characterizations of early modem 
Japan. And like most mythistories, it is by no means wholly 
incongruent with current scholarly opinion; indeed, many of the 
issues that I present here as "myths" continue to be hotly debated 
among historians. Still, the extreme version offered above would 
be seen today as hopelessly one-sided. It is a version of -µte past 
that has its origins in the nineteenth century, and although it 
may smack of Western bias, it has in fact been promoted vigor-
ously by many Japanese themselves, and across a wide political 
spectrum. Those who supported the Meiji state certainly favored 
such a negative estimation of the ancien regime, but so did the 
Marxist opponents of the twentieth-century Japanese state who 
saw Meiji as perpetuating the worst features of the Tokugawa 
order. 
To dissect this mythology, let me separate out five elements in 
the above characterization of Tokugawa Japan as a way of placing 
it more effectively in the history of the West and the world. 
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MYTH #1: "Japan is a small country." This a useful proposi-
tion to discuss at the start of any introductory course on 
Japan. The correct response of course is, "it all depends." In 
land area, Japan is indeed small relative to the three neighbors 
which have had a major impact on its history at various times: 
China since ancient times, Russia since the later eighteenth 
century, and the United States since the early nineteenth cen-
tury. But when compared to·Korea (too often forgotten in such 
comparisons by Japanese themselves) or to the nation-states of 
Western Europe (which for reasons outlined in the next section 
is perhaps the best comparative framework for the early modern 
period), then Japan is about normal size. In terms of today's 
national boundaries, it is two-thirds the size of France, three-
quarters that of Spain, about the same size as Germany, 
roughly one-quarter larger than Italy or the British Isles, and 
three-quarters bigger than the Korean Peninsula. 
But when Japanese today claim, as they have been increas-
ingly prone to do since the nineteenth century, that theirs is a 
"small" country, they more often mean that it is semai, densely 
populated and cramped for space. In the contemporary world, 
Japan is Indeed densely populated: at 850 people per square 
mile, only Holland (952) and Belgium (842) are in the same 
leagqe in Europe, although in an Asian context there are even 
denser nations, such as Bangladesh (2028), Taiwan (1478), or 
South Korea (1134). 1 And of course, as is always 'stressed, 
much of Japan's land area is mountainous ("only 16 percent 
arable" is a common formula) and inhospitable to habitation. 
What about early modern times, however, when the population 
was only one-fourth what it is today, and far less heavily concen-
trated in crowded cities? Even then, it was still a dense country 
by comparison either with its Asian neighbors or with European 
nations. In about 1700, for example, Japan was about twice as 
densely populated as France or the British Isles. TI1is means of 
course that in absolute population size as well, early modem 
yapan was a very large country, its 30 million people making it 
larger than any European nation in 1700, including France (22 
lnmion) and Russia· (20 million).2 
On a world scale, then, early modem Japan was a "small coun-
try" only in relation to its great historical neighbor China, the 
nation that rightfully continued to be the cornerstone of Japan's 
larger perception of "the world." The Indian subcontinent was 
much -larger in population, but was not under a unified state. 
Russia, which emerged as the first great outside threat to Japan 
516 HENRY D. SMITH, II 
in the eighteenth centmy, was far larger in area but smaller in 
population, most of it a great distance away. Within a European 
framework, Japan was large in both area and population. 
MYI'H #2: ''Tokugawa Japan was a feudal society." Th.is is the 
most complex and intriguing issue for placing Japan in world 
history. In teaching about feudalism, it is necessary first to deal 
with the popular sense of "feudal," which whether in English or 
Japanese (as lwkenteki) tends to mean anything that is old-fash-
ioned, authoritarian, and hierarchical. It is what teenagers call 
their parents, akin to "medieval" or "primitive." It is necessary to 
put to one side this colloquial sense of the term before approach-
ing feudalism as an analytical concept of historical change. 
Feudalism as a tool of historical analysis has a complex history, 
and its meaning for Japan has been widely debated.3 Without 
going into the details, however, it seems fair to say that most 
historians today would agree that if "feudalism" is defmed such 
that it is more than a local phenomenon of western Europe, but 
less than a historical stage through which all societies must pass 
(as in most Marxist schemes), then the one non-European society 
that indisputably had a feudal period was Japan.4 No other candi-
date comes nearly as close, and none of Japan's East Asian neigh-
bors is even a candidate (notwithstanding the voluminous 
literature on Chinese feudalism) . 
. The problem, however, is one of timing. All agree that Japan 
reached the stage of "high feudalism" in the period from the late 
fifteenth 'to the early sixteenth century, when central authority 
was minimal and the nation divided into territories under the 
rule of military lords known as daimyo, each ruling through 
bands of vassal warriors who gave their loyalty in return for 
landed fiefs .. In the decades that followed, however, the country 
was reunified and a new central regime finally established 
under the Tokugawa line after 1600. It fell short of total unifi-
cation, however, with upward of three hundred lords continuing 
to rule their own fiefs directly, and reciprocal loyalty to the 
shogun the continuing basis of control. 
Many modern Japanese historians, working under the influ-
ence of Marxist theories of stage development, have seen the cre-
ation of the Tokugawa regime as a freezing of earlier feudal 
patterns, or even as a "refeudalization" after the defeat of embry-
onic trends toward capitalism and the absolutist state. American 
historians of Japan have tended rather to mobilize the oxymoronic 
concept of "centralized feudalism." Today most would agree that 
such efforts to preserve the concept of feudalism simply undercut 
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the comparative leverage that the concept was designed to allow, 
since no European society was ever "refeudalized" or "frozen" for 
over two .centuries past its feudal peak. 
Unfortunately, no good alternative paradigm- has yet emerged to 
replace feudalism as a comparative concept, but the most persua-
sive tool these days is an old one-the state. However "feudal" the 
Tokugawa regime may have appeared at the start, by the early 
nineteenth century it indisputably had many of the marks of a 
European state. Control over the daimyo was efficient and consis-
tent, as reflected by the remarkable uniformity of methods of 
taxation and administration of justice among the domains. To be 
sure, the Tokugawa state was not "absolutist" in any European 
sense: there was no national army, no uniform national currency, 
no state bureaucracy extending to the local level. If one defines 
the state in terms of monopolization of the means of coercion, 
however, the Tokugawa regime was very state-like.5 The one criti-
cal contrast with the states of early modern Europe was the ab-
sence of the one imperative that most drove the engine of 
absolutism: foreign war. Japan, in other words, was distinguished 
not by being feudal, but by being peaceful-an attribute that 
made it more Asian than European. 
MYfH #3: "The Tokugawa regime was a police state." Japan 
may have been peaceful abroad, but what about at home? The 
characterization· of Japan as a kind of police state appears in 
many of the first Western accounts of Japan in the nineteenth 
century, which emphasized in particular the use of spies by the 
Tokugawa regime-a reference to the censors, or metsuke, who 
made sure that both domain and bakufu officials stayed in line. 
Later Japanese and Western scholarship has rather devoted at-
tention to the heavy levels of surplus extracted from the peas-
antry, which was often reduced to poverty and driven to revolt. 
There is no doubt that Japan was autocratically ruled by the 
samurai class, and that justice was severe. But we also have the 
testimony of European obseivers, both at the beginning and end 
of the era, that justice was also leveled equally, and was rarely 
arbitraiy. Punishments were harsh and often cruel, but they were 
never inflicted before large and leering public crowds as in early 
modem Europe. 
More generally, it might be proposed that the Tokugawa state 
was relatively passive in its exercise of coercive authority. Both in 
villages and cities, most administration was left to local autono-
mous units. To be sure, it was autonomy only at the indulgence of 
the state, and in no sense true self-government. Still, the state 
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was content for the most part not to interfere. In the techniques of 
administration as well, the "feudal" Tokugawa regime favored 
checks and balances rather than overt coercion. The entire na-
tional system of dairnyo domains was in fact an intricately bal-
anced network of power, further held together by the requirement 
of "alternate attendance" (sankin kotai) that obliged every dairnyo 
to live in alternate years in Edo, the capital. Many official posts 
were held in tandem, with two officials rotating every year or 
half-year to obviate entrenched corruption. Responsibility was im-
posed on groups, and punishment for individual crimes was suf-
fered by the group as a whole. Such techniques were common in 
China as well. 
1bese notions of collective responsibility were very different 
from the situation in western Europe, where the state was obliged 
to carve out its coercive realm in the face of a growing sense of 
absolute property rights and individual political rights. The levels 
of violence to which European societies were subjected in this 
confrontation were probably much higher than in Japan or other 
East Asian societies of the seventeenth or eighteenth century. So 
was Japan a police state? Well-policed to be sure, and oppressive. 
But it was relatively even-handed oppression, and almost never 
despotic. Much depends on one's relative valuation of the private 
individual versus the community. 
MYTH #4: "Tokugawa Japan was divided into four separate 
classes." Tilis formula has been recited so many times that it will 
take a long time to overcome it. The notion is flawed in two ways. 
First, the division was not into socioeconomic "classes," but rather 
into what are better called "estates," groupings by occupation. 
Second, it was an ideal formula, borrowed from Chinese Neo-Con-
fucian doctrine, that never really fit the reality of Japan (or even of 
China, for that matter). The basic division in Tokugawa Japan 
was between samurai and nonsamurai, but even here the distinc-
tion was often blurred, since mobility across the line increased 
with time. Moreover, the samurai estate encompassed a wide 
range of socioeconomic stratification, from the dairnyo aristocracy 
on down to rowdy foot soldiers whose lot in life was little better 
. than common coolies. It is often asserted that a samurai could cut 
down with impunity any commoner who insulted him. Tilis was 
simply not true: any samurai exercising the right in question 
would be obliged to provide elaborate justification for the act, and 
as often as not suffer punishment for its commission. 
The nonsamurai estates were similarly stratified, and the lines 
between them never really enforced. The primary restriction was 
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that of residence, since fai-mers were in theory forbidden from 
moving to the cities. This was never enforced except in the most 
futile and sporadic ways, and mobility between city and country 
was rapid and increasing throughout the period. Technically, land 
was inalienable, but in practice land was inherited, traded, and 
:QJ.arketed (albeit under legal constraints). 
, None of this is to deny that Tokugawa ~ociety was elaborately 
differentiated-but so were all premodern societies. A person's 
status and occupation were immediately apparent from appear-
ance, with complex rules of dress and hair style. It is often alleged 
that such things were minutely prescribed by law, but this is 
incorrect: bakufe. regulations were proscriptions rather than pre-
scriptions, rules not about what one should wear but about what 
one should not wear. These proscriptions were rarely obeyed (and 
hence frequently repeated), and at any rate were far less import-
ant than the endless customary rules that emerged spontaneously 
in a highly status-conscious society, particularly in the cities 
where people constantly encountered strangers. 
A final rnislea4ing feature of the "four-class" formula is the 
valuation implied by the hierarchy, with peasants coming just 
after the samurai elite, and merchants at the very bottom. It is 
important to remember that the hierarchy was not one of people, 
but of function: it was not peasants above merchants, but farming 
above trade. As the British historian G.B. Sansom nicely summed 
up the plight of peasants, Tokugawa statesmen "thought highly of 
agriculture, but not of agriculturalists. "6 As for merchants, they 
were far less denigrated as a group than the formula implies. 'Ibe 
earliest elite merchants in Tokugawa cities were of samurai origin, 
and many merchant families maintained house codes and cus-
toms that closely paralleled those of samurai. Contempt for trade 
was far less deeply rooted in the Japanese elite than in the Chi-
nese gentry class (and even there it was less virulent than often 
depicted). Rather, the relationship between ·samurai and mer-
chant should be seen, as anthropologist William Kelly has argued, 
as one of "essential mutualism," each depending on the other and 
acutely aware of their reciprocal dependency.7 
For proof of the inadequacy of the four-class stereotype, one 
need only look to the first years of the Meiji period, when all 
limitations of occupational estate were dropped and the only 
group to protest was a small minority of the samurai. At the same 
time, ex-samurai were even more numerous than merchants 
among the leading entrepreneurs of Meiji; so much for their con-
tempt of trade. 
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MYTH #5: "Tokugawa Japan isolated itself from the rest of the 
world for over two centuries." Th.is is in many ways the most 
pernicious of all the myths about early modem Japan. Although 
the Eurocentric quality of the formulation is immediately appar-
ent, it has in fact been sustained by the Japanese themselves as 
much as by Westerners. The standard cliche is "self-imposed iso-
lation," and it often goes under the Japanese term sakoku, trans-
lated as "closed countzy." Th.is is the term, for example, applied to 
the series of edicts of 1633-39 that excluded the Catholic nations 
of Spain and Portugal from trade with Japan and forbade Japa-
nese from traveling abroad. In the conventional historiography, 
Japan is seen as retreating into an isolationist shell, like a hermit 
crab, thereby shutting itself off from all the progressive influences 
available from Europe. 
1bis whole picture has been completely revised in English-lan-
guage scholarship by the work of Ronald Toby, who argues that 
what has been called "isolation" was in large part a restoration of 
normal relations by Japan with the two neighbors that had al-
ways been most important to it, China and Korea. 8 Part of the 
process, to be sure, involved excluding the Catholic nations of the 
West, but this was largely a political measure aimed at controlling 
the threat of aggressive and disruptive Westerners. A few simple 
points should be remembered. First, the concept of "isolation" or 
"closing" never appeared in either the minds or the words of the 
Tokugawa rulers. The term sakoku made its first appearance, 
rather, in the early nineteenth century in a Japanese translation 
of an essay by Engelbert Kaempfer, a German doctor who traveled 
to Japan in 1690-92 and left a remarkable description of the 
countzy. The title (too long to quote here in its entirety) begins "An 
Enquiry, whether it be conducive for the good of the Japanese 
Empire, to keep it shut up, as it is now, and not to suffer its 
inhabitants to have any Commerce with foreign nations, either at 
home or abroad. "9 The real irony is that Kaempfer's answer to the 
question posed in the title was a resounding "Yes!" He had noth-
ing but admiration for the Japanese for avoiding the kind of for-
eign entanglements that led only to the ceaseless hatred and 
bloodshed that he had obseived firsthand in mid-seventeenth-
century Europe. Kaempfer's essay remains today one of the most 
remarkably perceptive accounts of Tokugawa Japan available, 
and is essential reading for anyone interested in the period. 
But was Japan in fact all that isolated? Consider the fact that 
Japanese foreign trade actually increased somewhat in the wake 
of the alleged "closing" of the countzy, and continued to flourish 
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until the end of the seventeenth century. 10 The eventual reduction 
of trade after 1715 was the result not of any isolationist impulse, 
but rather of a bullionist belief in the need to preserve the nation's 
precious metals for the minting of new coins rather than the 
payment for exports. At the same time, the cultural impact of the 
trade with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki continued to in-
crease. In 1 721, just as total trade was being reduced, the shogun 
Yoshimune lifted the import ban on Chinese translations of West-
ern books as long as they did not deal with Christianity. This 
marked the beginning of what by the end of the century would 
become a flourishing movement in Western Learning, first by way 
of Chinese translations and then through original Dutch texts 
that Japanese scholars laboriously learned to read. Th.is Western 
knowledge, however imperfectly understood, had a tremendous 
leavening effect in Japanese intellectual life. 
Stock descriptions of Tokugawa Japan depict the continuing 
trade through Nagasaki as a minor exception to an isolationist 
policy, seeing it as a "tiny loophole" or a "crack in the door." I 
prefer the m~taphor of a relay or an "antenna" by means of which 
Japan received a continual flow of knowledge and information 
from both China and the West, as well as countless cultural 
objects that worked their o~ ways of change. It is impossible to 
tell the story of Tokugawa art, for example, without reference to 
the transformations wrought by continuing input from both Chi-
nese paintings and Western copperplate prints. The highly devel-
oped internal network of communications in Japan by way of the 
sankin kotai further insured that new knowledge spread rapidly to 
even the most remote castle towns. 
Elsewhere in this volume, William Rowe has made a similar 
point about China, arguing that the "much-vaunted isolationism" 
of this era was largely limited to paper edicts, and that China's 
basic "attitude toward the outside world in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was anything but passive and defen-
sive." The Japanese in the same period were undeniably more 
restrictive than the Chinese, effectively prohibiting any Japanese 
from traveling abroad. But they participated in the same East 
Asian world order, which was "isolationist" only in comparison to 
the aggressive expansionism of Western Europe. We are finally 
brought back to the matter of war and peace. The acceptance of 
orderly hierarchical relations among the nations of East Asia was 
basically a policy of peaceful coexistence rather than isolationism. 
It was a state of. affairs that Europe should perhaps have envied 
rather than challenged. 
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